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Abstract: In our investigation we are expanding a Bertrand-Edgeworth
duopoly into a two-stage game in which during the first stage the firms can
select their rationing rule. We will show that under certain conditions the
efficient rationing rule is an equilibrium action of the first stage.
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1 Introduction
We will investigate a two-stage extension of the capacity constraint Bertrand-
Edgeworth duopoly game. In stage one both firms simultaneously announce
a rationing rule, according to which they will serve the consumers, if they
become the low-price firm. In stage two they are engaged in a modified ca-
pacity constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth game. We will refer to this game as
the rationing game.
Davidson and Deneckere (1986) already formulated a three-stage exten-
sion of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game in that each duopolist can select the
way it will serve the consumers, if it becomes the low-price firm. In their
model the firms compared to our rationing game additionally can select their
capacity levels. They established that in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
the duopolists will serve the consumers according to the random rationing
rule. Their result assumes that the duopolists are risk-neutral. On that point
our analyzes will differ.
For a full specification of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game we need a so-
called rationing rule. The aggregate demand function and the rationing rule
together contain enough information on the determination of the duopolists’
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sales. We will introduce the notion of combined rationing, which contains
as special cases the two most frequently used rationing rules, the so-called
efficient and random rationing rules. For a description of these rationing rules
see for example Tirole (1988).
It has been shown for linear demand curves that when capacities are
either small or large, then the Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with capacity
constraints has an equilibrium in pure strategies (see Wolfstetter, 1993).
However, for capacities in an intermediate range, the model only has an equi-
librium in mixed strategies. The mixed strategy equilibrium was computed
in closed form by Beckmann (1965) for random rationing and by Levitan and
Shubik (1972) for efficient rationing. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b) demon-
strated the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in the case of random
rationing for demand curves which intersect both axes.
In Section 2 we will introduce the set of rationing rules from which the
firms can choose their first stage action. In Section 3 we will determine the
set of those capacity levels for which the Bertrand-Edgeworth game has a
pure strategy equilibrium. In Section 4 we will establish that if the firms
have special preferences above the set of expected profits and uncertainty,
then in the first stage of the rationing game the efficient rationing rule is an
equilibrium action.
2 Rationing rules
We impose the following assumptions on the demand curve.
Assumption 2.1 We shall consider demand curves that are strictly decreas-
ing, continuously differentiable, and intersect both axis.
Assumption 2.2 The function G(p) := pD′(p)+D(p) is strictly decreasing.
A monopolist facing a demand curve satisfying Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 has
a unique positive revenue maximizing price. Let us denote the set of demand
curves fulfilling Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 by D. The demand facing firm
j ∈ {1, 2} is given by a rationing rule. In our model we allow the duopolists
only to choose from a special class of rationing rules. We call these combined
rationing rules.
Definition 2.3 A function ∆ : D × R2+ × R2+ → R2+ is called a combined
rationing rule with parameter λ ∈ [0, 1], if the demand firm j ∈ {1, 2} faces
is given by
∆j(D, p1, p2, q1, q2) :=

D(pj) if pj < pi, i 6= j;
qj
q1+q2
D(pj) if pj = pi, i 6= j;
max (D(pj)− α(pi, pj)qi, 0) if pj > pi, i 6= j;
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where α(pi, pj) = (1− λ)D(pj)D(pi) + λ.
The efficient and the random rationing rules are also combined rationing
rules. We can see this by selecting for λ in Definition 2.3 the values 0 and 1
respectively.
We describe two different markets in which a combined rationing rule can
be implemented. First, suppose that there are n consumers with identical
individual demand functions d(.), who are served by the low-price firm in
order of their arrival. Let n be sufficiently large, so that the amount purchased
by the marginal consumer, who still obtains a positive level of the product,
can be neglected. Let p1 < p2 and q1 ≤ D(p1) = nd(p1). The low-price firm
can serve m := bq1/d(p1)c consumers totally. Fix an arbitrary value 0 ≤ λ ≤
1. Assume that firm 1 serves m1 := b(1− λ)q1/d(p1)c consumers completely.
Each remaining consumer obtains q1−m1d(p1)
n−m1 amount of the product. In the
described case the residual demand is
Dr(p2) ≈ D(p2)− (1− λ)q1D(p2)
D(p1)
− λq1,
if n is sufficiently large. The way how the low-price firm serves the con-
sumers combines the two different methods, how on the market with iden-
tical consumers the efficient and the random rationing rule can be achieved
(see Davidson and Deneckere, 1986). However, on the same market a com-
bined rationing rule can also be implemented, if each consumer can purchase
q1
n
(λ+ (1− λ)d(p2)/d(p1)) amount of the product.
Second, we assume that D(p) is the summation of inelastic demands of
heterogenous consumers, all of whom want to purchase one unit of the good,
provided the price is below their reservation price. Suppose the low-price
firm begins with selling (1 − λ)q1 output on a first-come-first-served basis.
The consumers served in that way are a random sample of the consumer
population. Hence, the demand of the so far unsatisfied consumers at price
p2 is D(p2) − (1 − λ)q1D(p2)/D(p1). Thereafter, it sells the remaining λq1
output to the consumers with the highest reservation values first. This leads
to a combined rationing rule with parameter λ.
It is worthwhile to mention that if the demand side of the market can
be described by a representative consumer having a Cobb-Douglas utility
function u(x,m) = Ax(1−λ)mλ where x is the amount purchased from the
duopolists’ product and m is the consumption from a composite commodity,
then we obtain a combined rationing rule with parameter λ on the market
(for details see Tasna´di, 1998).
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3 Pure strategy equilibrium
For given λ1 and λ2 we determine the set of those capacity levels to which pure
strategy equilibrium exists in the capacity constraint Bertrand-Edgeworth
game. Let us remark that the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium follows
easily from Dasgupta’s and Maskin’s Theorem 5 (1986a).
We assume without loss of generality that the marginal costs of the firms
are zero. We consider the capacity constraints k1 and k2 of the two firms as
given.
We restrict ourselves to capacities from the set
L := {(k1, k2) ∈ R2++|k1 + k2 ≤ D(0)}
because for capacities not in L the Bertrand-Edgeworth game reduces to the
Bertrand duopoly, or it will not have a pure strategy equilibrium for any ra-
tioning rules. To any λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1] parameters describing the rationing rules
of the firms, we introduce the set K(λ1, λ2) ⊂ L containing those capacity
levels for which the corresponding Bertrand-Edgeworth game possesses Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies. Assumption 2.2 assures that K(λ1, λ2) will
not be empty.
Proposition 3.1 The set K(λ1, λ2) increases strictly if min{λ1, λ2} in-
creases so far as K(λ1, λ2) 6= L. If (k1, k2) ∈ K(λ1, λ2), then the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium is given by
q∗i = ki and p
∗ = p∗1 = p
∗
2 = D
−1(k1 + k2). (1)
Proof: First, we show that only (1) can be an equilibrium. No equilibrium can
exist with p1 < p2 because, ifD(p1) > k1, firm 1 will want to increase its price,
and if D(p1) ≤ k1, firm 2 will wish to reduce its price below p2. Similarly, no
equilibrium is possible with p2 > p1. There cannot be an equilibrium with
p1 = p2 > p
∗, since both firms have the incentive to lower their prices slightly.
It is obvious that a price below p∗ cannot be rational for any firm.
The price p∗ is the only candidate for a pure strategy equilibrium price.
The profit function of firm i for p∗ < p ≤ p is:
pii(p) = pD
r(p) = p
(
D(p)− λjkj − (1− λj)kj D(p)
D(p∗j)
)
,
where j 6= i and Dr(p) = 0. For prices greater than p the residual profit
function is zero. Hence, setting prices unilaterally above p is not rational,
because prices p∗ yield positive profits. The profit function is nonincreasing
for prices p∗ < p < p because of Assumption 2.2, if
dpii
dp
(p∗) = (p∗D′(p∗) +D(p∗))
(
1− (1− λj) kj
ki + kj
)
− λjkj ≤ 0 (2)
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holds. Rearranging (2) we obtain
G(D−1(ki + kj)) ≤ λjkj
1− (1− λj) kjki+kj
=
λjkj(ki + kj)
ki + λjkj
. (3)
We have that K(λ1, λ2) increases if min{λ1, λ2} increases, because (3) must
hold for both firms and λjkj(ki+kj)
ki+λjkj
is strictly increasing in λj.
It remains to show that the set K(λ1, λ2) increases strictly. Let us intro-
duce the following notations:
Kα(λ1, λ2) := {(k, αk) ∈ L|(k, αk) ∈ K(λ1, λ2)},
Kα∗ (λ1, λ2) := {(k, αk) ∈ L | k ∈ (0, D(0)/(1 + α)]}
for any α > 0. Rearranging (3) and substituting equal capacities we obtain
G(D−1((1 + α)k))
k
≤ (1 + α)λj
α + λj
. (4)
Obviously, an analogous condition to (4) must hold for firm j. Thus, (k, αk) ∈
Kα(λ1, λ2) if and only if
G(D−1((1 + α)k))
k
≤ min
{
(1 + α)λ1
α+ λ1
,
(1 + α)λ2
α+ λ2
}
. (5)
Furthermore, the left side of (5) is continuous for all k ∈ (0, D(0)
1+α
], there-
fore the set Kα(λ1, λ2) increases strictly if min{λ1, λ2} increases, as long as
Kα(λ1, λ2) 6= Kα∗ (λ1, λ2), because the function (1+α)λα+λ is strictly increasing in
λ for λ ∈ [0, 1].
If K(λ1, λ2) 6= L, then there is an α > 0 so that Kα(λ1, λ2) 6= Kα∗ (λ1, λ2).
Suppose that λ1 < λ
′
1 < λ2, then K
α(λ1, λ2) is a proper subset of
Kα(λ′1, λ2). Finally, sinceK
α(λ1, λ2) ⊂ K(λ1, λ2) andKα(λ′1, λ2)\Kα(λ1, λ2)
is nonempty and disjoint from K(λ1, λ2), therefore K(λ1, λ2) is a proper sub-
set of K(λ′1, λ2). We can argue similarly in the case of λ1 > λ2 and λ1 = λ2.
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If the demand curve is linear and if we restrict ourselves to symmetric
capacities, then K(λ1, λ2) has a simple structure, as we will establish in
Proposition 3.2. We have to mention that in case of a linear demand curve
the price and quantity units can be chosen so that the demand curve has the
form D(p) = 1− p. Let H(λ1, λ2) := {k ∈ (0, D(0)/2] | (k, k) ∈ K1(λ1, λ2)}.
Proposition 3.2 If the demand curve is D(p) = 1− p, then
H(λ1, λ2) =
(
0,
1
2
min
{
1 + λ1
2 + λ1
,
1 + λ2
2 + λ2
}]
. (6)
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Proof: Regarding the proof of Proposition 3.1 we only have to determine
those capacity constraints for which (2) holds for both firms in the case of
equal capacities. Therefore, for firm i ∈ {1, 2} the following inequality has to
be satisfied.
(−p∗ − 1− p∗)(1− 1
2
(1− λi))− λik = (4k − 1)1
2
(1 + λi)− λik ≤ 0 (7)
Rearranging (7) and regarding that it has to hold for both firms, we obtain
(6). 2
If both firms are serving the consumers according to the efficient rationing
rule, then by Proposition 3.2 we getH(1, 1) = (0, 1/4]. This well-known result
can be found for instance in Wolfstetter (1993). Additionally, if both firms
select the random rationing rule, then H(0, 0) = (0, 1/3]. This result can be
found in Tirole (1988) for example.
4 The rationing game
In this section we only want to indicate that in the two-stage game the
efficient rationing rule is under certain conditions an equilibrium first-stage
action.
The action sets of both firms in stage one is [0, 1] and in stage two it is the
set of price distributions with finite variances above the set [0, pˆ], where we
denote by pˆ the smallest price for that D(pˆ) = 0. A degenerated probability
distribution corresponds to a pure strategy in stage two. Now we modify
the payoff functions by assuming that the firms have preferences above the
space of expected profits and profit variances, which can be determined by
the chosen rationing rule and probability distributions.
Davidson and Deneckere (1986) found that random rationing is the equi-
librium action of the appropriate stage in the case when both firms prefer-
ences depend only on their expected profits. This means that the firms are
risk neutral. We investigate another extreme case in that both firms are ex-
tremely risk averse. Let the firms have the following lexicographic preferences
Â⊂ R2+
(e, v) Â (e′, v′) ⇔ v < v′ or (v = v′ and e > e′),
where e, e′ denote expected profits and v, v′ denote variances.
We introduce the set valued function Λ : L→ P([0, 1]× [0, 1]) as follows
Λ(k1, k2) := {(λ1, λ2) | ∃(k1, k2) ∈ K(λ1, λ2)}.
Proposition 4.1 If the two-stage game has a pure strategy subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, then choosing the efficient rationing rule in the first-stage
is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium action for both firms.
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Proof: If the two-stage game has a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium, then Λ(k1, k2) 6= ∅. After any first stage action (λ1, λ2) ∈ Λ(k1, k2)
both firms will set their price to p∗ = D(k1 + k2) because of Proposition
3.1. Firms are indifferent between any rationing rule pair from set Λ(k1, k2),
because in equilibrium they all guarantee the same profits without uncer-
tainty. The efficient rationing rule is always an equilibrium action of stage
one because (k1, k2) ∈ K(λ1, λ2) implies that (k1, k2) ∈ K(1, 1) regarding
Proposition 3.1. 2
5 Concluding remarks
These results indicate that the equilibrium rationing rule may lie between
the efficient and random rationing rule depending on the firms’ preferences
above expected profits and profit variances. This conjuncture deserves further
analyzes, although in general the expected values and variances cannot be
determined in closed form since in general the mixed strategy equilibrium
cannot be expressed in closed form either.
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